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Abstract
The concept of `utility' is often used in ambiguous ways in economics, from having sub-
stantive psychological connotations to being a formal placeholder representing a person's
preferences. In the accounts of the early utilitarians, it was a multidimensional measure that
has been condensed during the marginalist revolution into the unidimensional measure we
know today. But can we compare dierent pleasures? This paper assesses the evidence from
psychology and neurosciences on how to best conceive of utility. It turns out that empiri-
cal evidence does not favor a view of multidimensional utility. This does not eliminate the
possibility to make a normative argument supporting a multidimensional notion of utility.
Key words: utility, pleasures, neuroeconomics, multidimensionality of utility
JEL-classi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1. Introduction
The concept of `utility' is not an easy one. Not only is it a fuzzy notion which is be-
ing used with considerable ambiguity in economics (Broome, 1991b,a; Sen, 1991). It also
has undergone major transformations in the way it is commonly used within the discipline
(Stigler, 1950a,b; Bruni and Sugden, 2007): In ordinary English, utility means `usefulness'
but this usage is not what economists have in mind when using the term. In the economic
context, originally, the notion of utility has been dened by Bentham who borrowed it from
Hume (cf. Hume, 1994, 1740, Book III). For the classic utilitarians such as Bentham and
Mill, the notion of utility had a substantive meaning that was clearly related to pleasures
and pains (Sen, 1991, p. 279). Moreover, Bentham and Mill have understood utility to be
an irreducibly multidimensional notion, of which the dimensions were the dierent types of
pleasure and pain (Warke, 2000a,b,d).
During the marginalist revolution and in positivist economics afterwards, this conceptu-
alization changed dramatically, when utility was purged of any psychological content and
streamlined in order to allow for the formal analysis of marginal utility and constrained max-
imization (see Lewin, 1996; Bruni and Sugden, 2007). Today, the concept of utility is very far
removed from the meaning it had in its beginnings. What Samuelson (1947, p. 91) describes
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Jena Economic Research Papers 2009 - 099as the \hollowness of utility" is the fact that utility has become an abstract magnitude that
is only used as a placeholder for \that which represents a person's preferences." (Broome,
1991b, p. 3, italics in original) The concept that is fundamental and which (axiomatic) utility
theory starts with are individual preferences. From these, one arrives at a utility function
if preferences do obey some well-known standard textbook assumptions (Mas-Colell et al.,
1995, chs.1&3).
It seems indisputable that this turn toward a formally specied but materially empty
utility notion has considerably increased the \mathematical tness" of the concept (Warke,
2000b). However, its inherent ambiguity has come at a certain cost. First, utility is used
in economics in a dual role that is often con
ated, namely as a motivator of action and as
measuring rod for welfare (Sen, 1973, p. 253): An action is undertaken because of a forward-
looking preference which is directed to the future (`wanting'). The corresponding (expected)
utility is motivating the action. But having acted, the individual derives a certain amount of
utility from the action, the reward (`liking'). Both notions are subsumed under the heading
utility. While Berridge (1999) has shown that both wanting and liking often go hand in hand,
they can be dissociated; for instance can we desire things and ultimately not like them, an
interesting case for welfare analysis (see also Kahneman et al., 1997).
Second, and for the present paper more importantly, utility is nowadays usually under-
stood to be a onedimensional concept. But what about the classical utilitarians' idea of
dierent pleasures? Is the utility we derive from reading one of Shakespeare's sonnets the
same utility which we derive from eating an opulent meal at a ne restaurant? Or to take this
question one step further and put it in Mill's words: Is it better to be a dissatised Socrates
than a satised pig because some utility is of a higher quality than the other? We can see
that a multidimensional utility concept would, on the one hand, create diculties specifying
determinate choice because when pleasures are qualitatively dierent, on what basis can one
decide how to choose between them? On the other hand, the allusion to Mill's dictum shows
that the multidimensionality of utility also creates problems for the evaluation of individual
well-being and social welfare since it is not clear how to dierentiate between more and less
(morally) valuable pleasures.
In this paper, I will argue that the question of such a multidimensionality of utility can
be answered by recourse to recent ndings from the behavioral and neurosciences, or what
one could call a \naturalistic approach" to economics (Witt, 1987). I will start from the
methodological premiss that the positivist purging of all substantive psychological content
from economics has impoverished economic theorizing that now often relies on folk psycho-
logical intuition instead of well corroborated ndings from the behavioral sciences. In this
paper, the concept of utility shall be formulated therefore so as to be compatible with empiri-
cal ndings from other behavioral sciences, as these can help in settling substantive economic
disputes or aid in clarifying core economic concepts such as the utility notion (cf. Camerer
et al., 2005; Braeutigam, 2005; Kenning and Plassmann, 2005). With this argument, the
paper extends a discussion by Landreth and Bickle (2008), who have centered on a similar
question regarding neural substrates of a forward-looking utility notion relevant for decision-
making (`wanting'). Based on the available evidence, I here argue that utility as measuring
rod for welfare, i.e. `liking', seems to be processed as unitary in terms of a common currency
(McClure et al., 2004).
The paper is structured as follows: I will rst state the problem of uni- versus multidi-
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of the paper I then discuss relevant evidence from neurosciences and psychology to evaluate
whether utility is best understood as a multidimensional magnitude or not (section 3). Utility
here is linked to how the brain processes reward. While utility might be plural at its sources,
evidence points to the fact the utility is unidimensional as regards its neural substrate, i.e.
there exists a common neural currency. While I maintain that the empirical evidence does
not support a conceptualization of utility as multidimensional, this does not preclude that
one could give normative arguments in favor of conceiving of utility as a multidimensional
magnitude. I will discuss some diculties regarding such an argument in section 4 before
nishing with a conclusion (section 5).
2. Multidimensional Utility in Economics
In the economics of today, utility is conceptualized as a onedimensional variable derived
from the consumption of dierent goods. That means, drinking water, enjoying one's fame
or reading a stimulating novel all result in a comparable utility that can be evaluated on
the same scale. But is this really the case? Contrary to the use in economics today, the
classical utilitarians did seem to hold, as Warke (2000a,b,c) has persuasively shown, a multi-
dimensional view of utility. And doubts regarding the comparability of utility resulting from
dierent activities have also been succinctly summed up by Amartya Sen:
\How do we sum up, on the basis of some objective measures of intensities, the
respective desires for an ice-cream, freedom from a headache, writing the most
beautiful sonnet ever written, going to bed with one's favorite lm star, and being
morally impeccable?" (Sen, 1981, p. 200)
Prima facie intuition of the above sort against the idea that all pleasure should be sim-
ilar and easily comparable is usually taken as one main counter-argument against hedonist
accounts (Sumner, 1996, p. 90). Often, even proponents of hedonism do reject such `inter-
nalist' versions of hedonism in favor of `externalist' versions, where pleasures are allowed to
dier while the common dening feature is a pro-attitude one has towards these qualitatively
dierent pleasures.1
But a potential multidimensionality of utility does pose diculties on multiple levels.
For example in the case of aggregating these dimensions into one measure of social welfare
(when comparing two or more dierent economic states with respect to the utility proles
of the individuals involved), one encounters the index number problem, which describes the
impossibility to arrive at a ranking of some states that dier in respect to more than one
independent quality: Given n persons and m qualitatively dierent pleasures, one needs a
matrix of mn intra- and interpersonal aggregation weights in order to arrive at a numerical
representation of social welfare. Without these weights, it would be impossible to use such
calculus except in trivial situations (such as those where dierences in pleasures and pains
1This type of refutation comes also by the name of \Brentano's cigar", who asks us \how ridiculous it
would be if someone said that the amount of pleasure he has in smoking a good cigar is such that, if it were
multiplied by 127, or say by 1.077, it would be precisely equal to the amount of pleasure he has in listening
to a symphony of Beethoven or in viewing one of Raphael's madonnas." (Brentano, 1969; Feldman, 2004)
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generic pleasure according to which acts can be ranked.
But let us put normative considerations aside and think about the positive side of an irre-
ducible multidimensional utility notion. When contemplating which action to choose, there
arises a severe problem for the specication of determinate choice. To exemplify, consider a
person and her motivation to act in a multidimensional utility framework. When facing two
possible actions A and B and the question whether to choose A or B, that person would be
guided by the utility associated with action A and B, viz. u(A) or u(B). Let us assume equal
duration, and exclude questions of uncertainty. The intensity of the pleasure associated with
actions A or B still seems to be subject to considerable subjectivity. And in order to come to
a conclusion whether to choose A or B as an action, an individual has to be able to trade-o
dierent pleasures with each other and trade-o dierent pleasures with dierent pains. Sup-
pose for example, the simplest case of only one type of pleasure and one type of pain related
to both actions. Assuming cardinality, if A results in a pleasure of 5 units and a pain of  3
units and B in pleasure of 7 and pain of  6, what action to choose? The individual would
have to be able to specify how many units of pain are traded-o against one unit of pleasure
(assume the ratio is one to one, then one could calculate u(A) = 2 and u(B) = 1 and the
individual would prefer A over B. If such a trade-o cannot be specied, it is unclear how
to order u(A) = f5; 3g and u(B) = f7; 6g). If there exists the possibility that there are
even more than two pleasure dimensions, one would have to have more weights to internally
compare the components and thus calculate an utility index. Such an index number problem
then is straightly transferred into the theory of consumer behavior, where commodities are
bundles of qualitatively dierent pleasures and pains (Warke, 2000a, p. 375).
The question of whether dierent pleasures are comparable with respect to their intensity
|even if only restricted to the intrapersonal context| thus creates a pronounced problem:
If intensities of dierent pleasures were comparable, one would have a common scale to
calculate trade-os, otherwise dierent intrapersonal weights would be needed to make these
qualitatively dierent pleasures comparable. Sen has already pointed out that depending
on the degree of comparability one can reasonably assume, only partial orderings might
be possibly arrived at (Sen, 1981, pp. 204-5): The minimum partial ranking would be the
intersection of the rankings re
ecting dierent pleasures, i.e. no weights are specied and the
respective u() can only be ranked under restricted conditions, viz. u(A) can only be ranked
as higher than u(B) if all elements of u(A) are ranked higher than those of u(B).2 In the other
extreme case, if it were possible to rank pleasures on a common scale, the dierent weights are
given and a complete ordering (the weighted sum) is possible. Of course, intermediate cases
are conceivable if one might specify ranges for the dierent weights. Finally, this problem
of intrapersonal comparisons of pleasures does transfer straight to the interpersonal case (of
which is abstracted here).
In a more systematic fashion, there are three dierent ways for the economist of dealing
with the index number problem in order to be able to cope with the problem of determinate
choice (Warke, 2000a). The rst strategy is to conceive of pleasure and pain as suciently
2Setting aside complications if components are negative (the ranking would have to be reversed) or if
pleasures are not monotonic (when more of a pleasure at a certain point would be evaluated negatively).
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pleasure and pain comes a feeling of enjoyment or satisfaction that is homogeneous across
the types of pleasures and pains. If such a feeling of enjoyment were assumed and it could
be argued to be suciently homogeneous, the index number problem would not arise and
utility as an index number could be calculated in summing up the enjoyment of dierent
activities. Then determinate choice would favor the action that maximizes this feeling, a
complete ordering would be possible (note this pertains to the general possibility, practical
measurement might complicate this issue).
A dierent strategy (2) would be the assumption of a state of `indierence equilibrium'
in which the individual is when contemplating over dierent actions. While the rst strategy
solves the problem of determinate consumer choice from bottom up in asserting the homo-
geneity of pleasures and pains, the assumption of an indierence equilibrium does so top
down (Warke, 2000a, p. 382). The argument basically goes that the consumer chooses be-
tween bundles of goods in such a way that the pleasures resulting from a marginal increase
of expenditure on any of the goods are equal, even if the pleasures are qualitatively dierent.
To put it with the words of Alfred Marshall, who used this method:
\For instance the pleasures which two persons derive from smoking cannot be
directly compared: nor can even those which the same person derives from it at
dierent times. But if we nd a man in doubt whether to spend a few pence
on a cigar, or a cup of tea, or on riding home instead of walking home, then we
may follow ordinary usage, and say that he expects from them equal pleasures."
(Marshall, 1925, p. 15)
With this kind of equilibrium as a starting point and the assumptions of re
exivity and
continuity, again, a complete and transitive ordering over the set of alternatives can be arrived
at. However, it is a strong assumption to put the consumer into such a state of indierence
equilibrium all the time. Such an assumption rules out the idea of out-of-equilibrium con-
sumer behavior and, as Warke succinctly puts it, it is at least questionable whether the chosen
pepperoni/ham ratio on our pizza re
ects our long-run indierence equilibrium regarding the
pepperoni/ham ratio on a pizza (Warke, 2000a, p. 383).
The third strategy would be to impose a priori restrictions on an individual's preference
set. These restrictions are rationality assumptions that are chosen so as to imply that de-
terminate choice will be possible. This is done for example in axiomatic (expected) utility
theory, which starts with an individual's preferences. From these, one arrives at a utility
function if the preferences do obey some standard textbook assumptions such as complete-
ness and transitivity (Mas-Colell et al., 1995, chs.1&3): If preferences satisfy the conditions
of completeness and transitivity, they are called \rational". This notion of rationality implies
that an individual has a complete ranking of all commodities in commodity space X which
means he has a complete specication of his preferences for even the most exotic bundles of
commodities and this ranking must additionally be consistent in the sense of the transitivity
requirement.3
3Sometimes the third condition of re
exivity is also added. Since it is implied by the completeness
assumption, it is redundant however, cf. Mas-Colell et al. (1995), p. 6
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utility function u(x). This function assigns a numerical value to each element in X and ranks
these according to the preferences. We say u : X ! R is a utility function that represents
these preferences if 8 x;y 2 X : x  y $ u(x)  u(y) holds (where x and y are commodity
bundles from X and  denotes a preference relation).
The drawback of the third strategy is that in such a framework, all connotations with
sensory experiences or psychological qualities are lost in the technical meaning of the term
utility. If there is some psychic experience that is actually measured and what it would be
like is unclear. And of course, the rationality assumptions imposed on human preferences
are far removed from empirical reality as the many well-known ndings from behavioral
economics have shown (Loomes and Taylor, 1992; Spash and Hanley, 1995; Knetsch, 1992).
This lacuna also extends into the sphere of normative economics and social choice: Instead
of the psychologically oriented calculus, today only subjective preference orderings are what
utilitarian social philosophy is considering. What motivates people, and why their |only
formally specied| preference ordering is the way it is, is left unexplained in this kind of
economics.
Is there a possibility to decide which of the strategies to choose? Is utility best conceived
of as uni- or multidimensional? While Warke argues in favor of a multidimensional concept
(see Warke, 2000a, p. 373) on the grounds that none of the other strategies \commands
empirical support", he owes the reader the evidence. From a naturalistic point of view, such
a question should not be decided in an ad hoc or armchair fashion based on introspection but
based on sound empirical scientic evidence. The question of such a multidimensionality of
utility can be answered by recourse to recent ndings from the behavioral and neurosciences
(what one could call a \naturalistic approach" to economics, cf. Witt, 1987). In order to
decide the case, I will review some evidence from psychology and the neurosciences in the
following section.
3. A Neuroeconomic Perspective on Utility
Neuroeconomics has recently been excessively promoted as being able to help economists
in nally understanding human behavior with so far unknown scientic precision. Although
many of such sweeping claims in neuroeconomics can rightly be seen critically (see McCabe,
2008; Harrison, 2008, for a discussion of related methodological issues and the imprecision
still involved in this young sub-discipline), a plausible case can be made that neuroeconomic
methods do provide additional data for economic theorizing in general and can help shed light
on the underlying neural correlates of utility in our particular context (cf. also Jamison,
2008). Data gained in neuroeconomic experiments (or neuro-scientic data more general)
thus provides the economist with evidence to evaluate competing economic theories, if not
enabling the development of altogether new theories. Whether it nally will be possible to
conduct measurements of individual well-being directly in the brain is not a matter that
needs to be settled here. Nevertheless, linking the economic utility concept to its biological
and neural correlates oers the behavioral economist the possibility to turn back to a more
substantive utility notion, one that is not solely linked to choice behavior but to subjective
well-being, understood as the hedonic evaluation of an individual's actions.
In this section, I will therefore review a notion of utility that is in accordance with
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have opened up the black box of the human brain and allow us to understand when an
individual encounters a rewarding object (e.g. McClure et al., 2004). While I will not go into
the details of brain imaging (e.g. PET, fMRI etc.), I will link the ndings of brain sciences
with those established results from psychology.
By way of prolegomenon, recall the vital distinction in terminology made in the introduc-
tion: When using the notion of utility so far, there has been involved a certain ambiguity as
to its dual role as motivator of choice and as measuring rod for welfare. This double function
is often confounded (Sen, 1973, p. 253). It is therefore worthwhile to spill some ink on this
distinction. When facing a decision, choice is made on the basis of certain preferences and a
forward looking calculation (or estimation) of expected utility is made. That is, the individ-
ual arguably decides on a course of action on the basis of his desires that are directed to the
future. This has also been called `wanting' (Berridge, 1996, 1999). In biology, this notion of
wanting relates to appetite or incentive motivation. Having made the decision and taken an
action, the individual then faces the outcomes of his decision, for example the consumption of
a food item. Such an act of consumption or more broadly speaking the satisfaction of a desire
then leads to a feeling of reward, a pleasurable experience (this feeling of reward has a clear
biological role in homeostasis, see below). This pleasure aspect of utility, or in other words,
the `liking' aspect (the evaluative side, not the motivational side) is what I am interested in
the following discussion. It is this notion of utility that plays a role for assessing individual
well-being. Note that this pleasure aspect is an ex post evaluation or can also be the in-
stantaneous evaluation of the moment. Contrary to wanting (or expected utility), it denotes
the hedonic qualities of reward (of course, the forward looking motivational utility can be
based on previous experiences of `liking'). Berridge has clearly shown that both wanting and
liking often go hand in hand but can be dissociated. And as Knutson and Peterson (2005)
have made clear, both processes have dierent neural correlates, a distinction that has not
been made by Landreth and Bickle (2008): Opposed to their predominantly methodological
investigation that implicitly revolves around the decision-based notion of utility, what I am
looking into here is the biological and neurological representation of utility as pleasures, i.e.
the liking aspect of utility.
Seeking rewards is one essential feature for the survival and reproduction of all animals.
From a biological perspective, not the pursuit of pleasure and pain is the ultimate goal but re-
productive success. Nevertheless, nature ingeniously has endowed animal and man alike with
an elegant solution that favors these actions that are in general benecial for reproductive
success. This is achieved by making these actions rewarding for the organism. Rewards can
be understood to be all those stimuli that positively reinforce behavior; rewards thus increase
the probability of behavior (McClure et al., 2004, p. 260). There are many reinforcers that
are genetically hardwired to be reinforcing. These are called primary reinforcers and include
food, water, air, sexual stimuli etc. I will take the dierent innate reinforcers provided by
Millenson (1967) and as discussed in Witt (2001) for granted. They are a well established
fact in psychology (Damasio, 2003, pp. 131-2). Via associative learning, previously neutral
stimuli can be learned to be reinforcing as well. For example, one can conjecture that the
most prominent secondary reinforcer money is conditioned on other primary rewards. In
principle, all learned reinforcers are conditioned on primary reinforcers (even if the chain of
associations may sometimes be quite large and idiosyncratic; cf. Cabanac, 1979; McClure
7
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Being biological products, humans have (perhaps: unfortunately) not evolved to be happy
but to survive and reproduce (Camerer et al., 2005, p. 27). This is practically achieved by
a process called homeostasis, a process that seeks to regulate bodily functions in reaction
to changes in external and internal conditions. As such, they compensate for changes in
environmental conditions. One can think of the regulation of body temperature, the regular
intake of air, water and food as examples of homeostatic processes. Homeostatic processes
consist of two subprocesses. First, the organism detects a deviation from `set points' as
regards the parameters that are necessary to allow continued functioning of the organism.
For instance, the hot summer has increased our body temperature or the hunting for food
has dehydrated the organism. Then, mechanisms set in to restore the balance condition
in these monitored parameters (so to speak, bring back the organism into equilibrium; set
points comprise mostly of parameter ranges, not sharp levels). The organism begins to sweat
to reduce body temperature or becomes thirsty to motivate the replacement of lost 
uids.
These homeostatic processes mostly work without any deliberate intervention. The negative
hedonic feeling that is associated with the deviation from set points, i.e. the deprivation of
reinforcers discussed above, is nature's way of motivating action of the organism to restore
homeostatic balance. In that sense, sensory pleasure is a sign for the presence of a useful
stimulus (Cabanac, 1979). Closely related, and complicating the account a little more, is
the concept of \alliesthesia" (greek for: `changed sensation', see Cabanac, 1979), meaning
that a stimulus can be perceived to be pleasant or unpleasant depending on the inner state
of the organism. While deprivation is the negative motivator for action, alliesthesia is the
positive one, making stimuli more rewarding when an organism is deprived of them. In that
sense, pleasure and pain are \sovereign masters" (Bentham) motivating human action (see
also Cabanac, 1992).
What I want to review in this section, is however, how these rewards are mapped onto
brain functions. There have been established certain brain regions in which rewards are
processed (these regions dier from the regions where `wanting' or `expected utility' is pro-
cessed). The idea is now to get a deeper understanding of how reward is processed in the
brain to understand the neural substrates of (experienced) utility. As Camerer et al. (2005,
p. 10, their italics) show, \the study of the brain and nervous system is beginning to allow
direct measurement of thoughts and feelings". Especially the neurosciences have furthered
our understanding of what happens when an individual encounters a natural or conditioned
reinforcer. In this section, I review evidence drawing mainly from the literature of Kahneman
et al. (1997), Kahneman et al. (1999), Berridge (1996, 1999), Shizgal and Conover (1996),
Shizgal (1999) and others regarding where and how reward is processed in the brain. Al-
though there is diversity at the level of dierent reinforcers, the rewarding experience (i.e.
the `pleasure') that is associated with the removal of deprivation is largely a unitary one as
these authors show.
Before expanding on the hypothesis that reward is always processed \along a single nal
common pathway" (McClure et al., 2004, p. 261) and translated into one single \common
currency" (McFarland and Sibly, 1975), let us shortly get a picture on the brain areas in-
volved in reward processing. While dierent tasks activate dierent brain regions, it can
be taken as a quite well established fact that rewarding stimuli are consistently increas-
ing activity in the regions of the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC), the amygdala and the ventral
8
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oxygen. From increased blood 
ow in these regions, one thus infers increased neural activity.
This is measured non-invasively through functional magnetic resonance imaging/tomography
(fMRI). The measures taken thus do not report absolute levels but relative increases in blood

ow (Kenning and Plassmann, 2005, p. 345).
To establish the role of these regions in brain processing, a wide array of brain imaging
experiments have been conducted with a host of dierent stimuli that were presented, such
as food, juice, water (e.g. Berns et al., 2001; O'Doherty et al., 2002), smells (e.g. Gottfried
et al., 2002), sexual stimuli (e.g. Arnow et al., 2002), sexual behavior (e.g. Komisaruk et al.,
2004), conditioned rewards such as money and positive feedbacks (e.g. Delgado et al., 2000;
O'Doherty et al., 2001), but also abstract conditioned rewards such as light 
ashes (e.g.
Pagnoni et al., 2002) and social rewards (e.g. Aharon et al., 2001; Rilling et al., 2002; Rolls
et al., 2003). Although the functional mapping onto the OFC-Amygdala-NAcc complex
is crude in terms exact location, it seems fairly well established that reward processing
(evaluation) in general takes place in this region.
While the OFC has been found to receive direct input from primary taste and olfactory
cortices as well as from higher-order visual and somatosensory areas (Rolls, 2000) and is
thus an ideal place for the storage of reward values of sensory stimuli (McClure et al., 2004,
pp. 260-1), the amygdala seems involved in processing the intensity of positive and negative
stimuli (Anderson et al., 2003). The ventral striatum also plays an important role regarding
rewards because of its connection with the mesencephalic (midbrain) dopamine system: The
release of dopamine from the ventral striatum on the NAcc is experienced as highly rewarding
(Johnston, 1999, p. 116).
\Output from the limbic system, the pleasure pathway [i.e. the MFB, the medial
forebrain bundle, the pathway from striatum to NAcc], appears to be the com-
mon neurophysiological correlate of hedonic tone, and this output establishes the
important link between feelings and learning." (Johnston, 1999, p. 116)
As such, this pathway plays an important role in assessing reward and pleasure:
\Incredibly, the release of dopamine onto the nucleus accumbens has now been
established to underlie almost every form of pleasure that animals can experience.
Blocking the action of dopamine at the nucleus accumbens will [...] block the
pleasurable eects of a host of natural rewards, such as food and water and sex. In
addition, it has now been established that all addictive drugs [...] either directly
or indirectly activate the pleasure pathway and eventually release dopamine onto
the nucleus accumbens. The release of dopamine onto the nucleus accumbens,
then, appears to underly all of our reward feelings." (Johnston, 1999, p. 116)
Shizgal (1999) discusses evidence in research on brain stimulation reward (BSR). BSR
means basically that rats receive direct electrical stimulation in the brain reward centers. This
4Cf. Rolls (2007) for a more detailed discussion of these brain areas. Descriptions of the location and
functions of the OFC can be found in Rolls (2000) and of the amygdala and the ventral striatum circuits in
Everitt et al. (1999) and Delgado (2007). The OFC is approximately in Brodmann areas 45, 47, while the
amygdala can be found in areas 28, 34 and the NAcc/ventral striatum is located in area 34.
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required (ibid., p. 501) but it generally simulates natural reward very well (see also Conover
and Shizgal, 1994a,b). It does so in driving up what Kahneman et al. (1997) have called
\instant utility". Instant utility is the continuous evaluation of our sensory experience over
time. It has two aspects, namely a hedonic one (positive or negative valence; aective
evaluation) and an action component (insofar it biases or impels action; there is a pro-
approach bias for positive evaluation and an avoidance bias for negative evaluation). Now,
direct stimulation of brain areas in rats5 is subject to problems of precision. Can one give
evidence how reward is processed as regards natural reinforcers? The answer is yes.
While the neural activities are still partly mysterious to science, reinforcer-related behav-
ior is increasingly well-researched. I will stick to the model by Shizgal (1999) of what happens
when a so called `goal object' (a reinforcer) is encountered. Three dierent brain processes
work here in parallel: First there is perceptual processing to discern the identity, location
and physical properties of the object. Then there is evaluative processing which determines
goal worth. And third, a stop-watch timer process computes when the goal object will be
available and how often this will be the case. The latter two processes are then the basis to
calculate the payo of the object (i.e. the reward or utility).
Note that regarding the two processes, there is a certain multidimensionality of the `payo
record' of a reinforcer because reward depends on intensity, amount, time of occurrence, kind
of reinforcer etc. But this multidimensionality diers from one that would assert that the
pleasures resulting from dierent reinforcers dier regarding their qualities. Recall that
reward processing itself has been found to take place in certain regions of the brain:
\A large body of evidence implicates specic regions in reward processing, includ-
ing midbrain dopaminergic nuclei and target areas such as the striatum, as well
as orbitofrontal cortex and amygdala (see Everitt et al., 1999; Rolls, 2000; Schultz
et al., 2000). Two distinct components to reward processing are an anticipatory
component, often signaled by the presentation of a cue which reliably signals
the subsequent delivery of reward, and a consummatory component relating to
reward receipt (Berridge, 1996)." (O'Doherty et al., 2002, p. 815)
These areas are frequently cited for the computation of reward. But if stimuli dier re-
garding time, reward intensity etc., there is the question how the organism computes the
reward and adjusts behavior. The information contained in the multidimensional payo
record is condensed into a common internal unitary valuation by means of a \currency func-
tion" that expresses the value of the goal object on a common scale (Shizgal, 1999, p. 509).
The same is argued by (Montague and Berns, 2002, p. 279): \Together, these results suggest
that the OFS [orbitofrontal cortex and striatum] circuits act to generate a common internal
currency (scale) for the valuation of payos, losses, and their proxies (predictors of payos
and losses; ...)". Note that
\[w]ithout internal currencies in the nervous system, a creature would be unable
to assess the relative value of dierent events like drinking water, smelling food,
5Or for that matter, direct stimulation of brain areas in humans as in the experiments of Heath (1964),
whose subjects reported pleasure when stimulated in that way (cited from Berns, 2005).
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appropriate behavior, the nervous system must estimate the value of each of these
potential actions, convert it to a common scale, and use this scale to determine
a course of action. This idea of a common scale can also be used to value both
predictors and rewards." (ibid., p. 276)
One can argue that this internal condensation of a multidimensional prole of the payo
record results in the continuous calculation of \instant utility" (Kahneman et al., 1997;
Shizgal, 1999).
Summing up, a case can be made for the following view: Reward is processed in some
xed brain regions. The brain converts multidimensional payo records into one common
(neural) currency which is in turn the basis of our decisions but also of our evaluation of goal
worth. Were this not the case, we would be the proverbial Buridan's ass, not being able to
decide between sonnet and food. The internal currency can be conjectured to be the feeling of
reward that is associated with goal objects. There is no evidence that this reward (which we
would term `utility' in economics) is multidimensional as regards its neural correlates. This
lends support to the hypothesis that reward is also best understood to be unidimensional.
Consequentially, this comes to arguing that while of course there is a dierence in the feeling
when one eats something to remove hunger or one drinks something to remove thirst, the
evaluation in terms of hedonic tone is of the same quality.
4. Some Speculations on the Normative Relevance of the Findings
From an empirical point of view, I think it is fair to conclude that the evidence for a
truly multidimensional utility concept is lacking. At least internally, the brain is very able to
compute a single currency of pleasure (through an internal value function) and to trade-o
dierent goal objects regarding their `worth'. From a naturalistic perspective, it turns out
that Warke's strategy number one commands the most empirical support. Overall, I think
that empirical ndings do not lend much credibility to a true \vector view" (Sen, 1981) of the
nature of utility. However, while conceiving of utility as ultimately onedimensional concept,
this does not preclude disaggregating utility as regards the dierent types of reinforcers in
more concrete examinations.
Note that although there are many studies that relate to how subjective reward is modi-
ed by many components of a decision task (e.g. grade of deprivation, expectancy of future
reward, ...), I nd no evidence in favor of a real multidimensional construct of reward re-
garding the pleasure component; one could say, as do Shizgal and Conover (1996) and Shizgal
(1999), that utility is multidimensional in the sense that u(x) = f(pleasure, grade of depriva-
tion, time of next expected reinforcement, ...). Certainly, such a sort of multidimensionality
is not the one of qualitatively dierent pleasures and pains implied by Sen's quote in section
2. But do individuals systematically err when they attribute qualitatively dierent kinds of
pleasure to such distinct events as they were exemplied above? It could be conjectured that
since dierent neural processes (beside the reward process) are associated with the dierent
enjoyable situations, it might well be the case that humans are `fooled' into believing that the
qualities of pleasure involved in these dierent acts are dierent. But maybe the dierence
in perception (sensory inputs) is dierent while the associated hedonic value nevertheless
ranges on the same scale.
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ternalist account of hedonism that has been recently suggested by Crisp (2006a). According
to his internalist pluralist account of hedonism, there is a plurality of dierent feeling tones
of pleasure but the unifying element is that
`...there is a way that enjoyable experiences feel: they feel enjoyable. ...Enjoyment,
then, is best understood using the determinable-determinate distinction, and the
mistake in the heterogeneity argument is that it considers only determinates. En-
joyable experiences do dier from one another, and are often gratifying, welcomed
by their subject, favored, and indeed desired. But there is a certain common qual-
ity |feeling good| which any externalist account must ignore." (Crisp, 2006a,
p. 628)
Such an interpretation is plausible to the extent that the common factor in the diverse
enjoyable experiences cannot be understood as a sensation or feeling that is in a certain body
part. While `feeling good' is not a particular kind of determinate feeling, it is a determinable.
Such an account of enjoyment is not far away from our common everyday use of the concept.
One can ask an individual whether he enjoyed a particular experience, be that strolling
through the park, reading a novel or consuming a piece of cake. Moreover, the individual can
give an ordering after he enjoyed any of these experiences, if he had them. The interesting
point about such an internalist interpretation of hedonism is that it receives support from the
argument I have given on the neural representation of utility in section 3: A unitary brain
representation of reward can be argued to be the correlate of the determinable quality of
`feeling good'. By way of this argument, it is possible to preserve the appeal of the internalist
account of hedonism (namely its link to pleasures `feeling good', i.e. being rewarding) without
being vulnerable to objections from heterogeneous pleasures.
Of course, the whole discussion so far is notwithstanding the fact that one could make a
normative argument why one should conceive of utility (or well-being) as multidimensional.
One argument in favor of a multidimensional utility construct from a normative point of view
can be found exactly in the Senian quote provided in the beginning. If we introspectively ex-
perience utility of such diverse actions to be unrelated and qualitatively dierent, should this
intuition not be taken into account? A view that argues that utility is unidimensional here
runs risk on imposing paternalistically a utility notion that runs counter to common (norma-
tive) intuitions. This is the standard objection that is advanced against typical internalist
accounts of pleasure (Sumner, 1996, pp. 92-98).
This argument has been rened in terms of a thought experiment (see also Crisp, 2006b,
pp. 112-7, for an extensive treatment). If pleasure is homogeneous and ranked only according
to intensity and duration, the hedonist is committed to swallowing the following bitter pill:
Consider that you could choose between living the life of the composer Joseph Haydn (having
a duration of 77 years, with all the ups and downs of a creative artist's life) or living the life of
an oyster that is subjected continuously to a very small pleasure. Imagine that the duration of
the oyster life is successively extended. Then at some point, the sum of pleasures of the oyster
would outweigh the sum of pleasures of Haydn's life. Would not the hedonist be committed to
the absurd conclusion of choosing the life of the oyster? On the other hand, if we acknowledge
for higher pleasures, then one could claim that there is some discontinuity between the
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a view, no matter how much oyster pleasure one could get, it would be always less worth
than the higher pleasures involved in the life of Haydn. How can a unitary account of utility
possibly cope with this counter-argument?
Such a type of refutation can be qualied. First of all, the thought experiment is one
which is not exactly easy to fantasize about. How exactly do we envision, say, 2000 thousand
years of oyster life being continuously pleasant in a low sort of pleasure. Would that amount
to the mild pleasure of being tickled all these 2000 years? Can we really imagine how it is to
experience a life of 2000 years of that pleasure (keeping in mind that we do not adapt to the
pleasure). Part of the experiment is the idea that the pleasure does not loose its appeal. It is
as strong and pleasant in the beginning as in the end. If we enjoyed the rst second, we will
similarly enjoy all the remaining 63 billion seconds of the experience following that second.
Such an imagination taxes our faculty of correctly assessing the comparison. Schreiber and
Kahneman (2000) have shown that when forming these kinds of aggregative judgements, we
tend to use heuristics like the so called \peak-end-average" (the hedonic evaluation of this
episode would be the average of peak and end pleasure) resulting in duration neglect. These
ndings are usually not mentioned in the oyster example. Of course, when assessing the
oyster life according to such a heuristic, the resulting peak-end-average will be pitifully low,
therefore leading to an unwarranted bias in the intuitive judgement. I think this is a prime
example of how a naturalistic approach can also enrich normative theorizing: The thought
experiment draws its force from a faulty aggregation humans employ in assessing periods of
pleasure and pain. I submit that this explains why our intuition tells us that the oyster life
is unattractive.
Ryberg (2002) has given arguments that cast further doubt on the thought experiment.
While our preference for Haydn's life may be clear, a restatement of the problem can challenge
this idea. Consider a `higher pleasure' such as listening to Bach's organ works on the one
hand, and consider a `lower pleasure', maybe eating an apple on the other hand. Now imagine
how many apples it would take to make the pleasure equivalent. Many would say no (nite)
amount of apples would suce. But what about some other higher pleasures, which are
ranked not so high in enjoyment but are longer in duration. It would certainly be easier to
trade-o half an hour of Bach's organ works against, maybe, one hour of the violin concertos
of Schubert. And these maybe against seeing two hours of Shakespeare at a theater. And that
maybe against a longer (three hours) ne meal. And so on. Giving some more examples,
we would probably arrive at the least high of the higher pleasures and the highest of the
lower pleasures. Would one not be willing to sacrice then the higher pleasure for a much
longer lower pleasure? Such a chain of trade-os would then show (against our prima facie
intuition) that there is a continuum of pleasure between the highest and the lowest pleasure
and that there is no discontinuity involved.
What Ryberg here shows is that the test of whether we would prefer Haydn to the oyster
may be an example where there seems to be no trade-o possible, but that there are many
other cases where a trade-o indeed is possible. Therefore the objection is weakened. It is
just not so clear cut anymore. Ryberg has rened the argument further with introducing
probabilities in the calculus, for example getting the high pleasure only with a very small
probability (say listening to Bach with p = 0:00000001 but the small pleasure with very high
probability (having the apple with p = 0:99999999). Here our preference might be reversed
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the example. Imagine a life lled with many lower pains and a small chance of achieving
the higher pleasure. On the other hand, imagine a life lled with many lower pleasures.
According to the view that higher pleasures are discontinuously more valuable, one should
choose the rst alternative. But would our intuition still suggest that to be the case in the
example?! Based on these counter-examples, it is fair to conclude that the Haydn-oyster
objection is not as impeccable as it prima facie seemed.
Lastly, not only from a prudential, but also from a moral point of view, the idea that some
pleasures should be ranked higher (and thus be morally more relevant) than other pleasures
can constitute a powerful argument in favor of a multidimensional view of utility as well.
This argument is exemplied in Mill's dictum to better be Socrates dissatised instead of a
pig satised (Mill, 1863, ch.2). A \vector view of utility" then seems to be able to incorporate
dierent classes of moralities as Sen has argued and it would enable the welfare economist to
dierentially weigh dierent pleasures according to moral worth (Sen, 1981, p. 193). However,
the question that results is of course, on what grounds to distinguish between dierent utility
components. One would have to come up with a normative weight scale to trade-o dierent
utility components. Whether there can be made an impeccable argument how this scale
would have to look like (equal weighting or discounting of some pleasures and not of others,
etc.) is not clear and can been doubted (see also Sen, 1981).
The weighing problem thus translates to any utilitarian prescriptive theory of the right, in
which the rightness of actions is determined through a felic calculus that forms a net total of
pleasures over pains. While the standard utilitarian calculus suers from the high rationality
and perfect foresight requirement on the individual or social planner who would have to
calculate the future expected consequences of an action (in terms of utility), this problem
were even more pronounced when utility were assumed to be irreducibly multidimensional.
Moreover, if one were to base a welfare measure on a multidimensional concept of utility
(i.e. assuming multidimensional welfarism such as the position discussed by Blackorby et al.,
2005), it also becomes crucial what informational requirements the underlying utility notion
can meet. This has been formalized in a social choice theoretic setting: Similar to the impos-
sibility result obtained by Arrow (1963) for a unidimensional utility concept and a welfare
aggregation based thereon, List (2004) has shown that in a multidimensional framework, one
would have to meet certain informational requirements regarding \interdimensional compa-
rability" (List, 2004, p. 120) in order to avoid an Arrovian impossibility result for that case:
Especially interdimensional non-comparability leads to an Arrovian impossibility result in
multidimensional utility space. Thus, from a normative point of view, the stipulation of
various dimensions of utility that are non-comparable cannot be judged to be attractive. Not
being able to meet some more demanding requirements on interdimensional comparability
would thus constitute another normatively relevant objection (for the welfarist) against a
multidimensional utility framework.
Summing up this discussion, I am not sure whether it's attractive to make a claim that
utility on the conceptual level should be conceived as multidimensional for normative reasons.
In accordance with the argument and evidence given in this paper, a welfare measure could
be built based on the notion of \experienced utility" (Kahneman et al., 1997), i.e. on the idea
that pleasure is a plausible normative maximand, not preference (Binder, 2009). It could be
used to solve the problems associated with the preference satisfaction view such as the fact
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were uninformed or biased). Going one step back to a unitary utility notion that retains its
reference to pleasure and pain such as in the framework above has thus interesting normative
ramications and might have the potential to put the focus of welfare economics on that
level where welfare should really lie, viz. at the level of pleasure. Indeed, basing a notion
of welfare on these constructs seems to even allow for the measurement of pleasures on a
common scale, as Kahneman et al. (1997) have shown. I agree with Feldman (2004) that
remaining practical measurement problems cannot be a challenge to the idea of a hedonist
account of utility or well-being on the conceptual level.
5. Conclusion
The concept of `utility' was never an easy one and it has undergone major changes in
its history. In Bentham's and Mill's classical utilitarian accounts, utility was a multidimen-
sional measure clearly related to many qualitatively dierent pleasures and pains. During
the marginalist revolution and in the heyday of positivism, this notion has been condensed
into the onedimensional measure known to economists today in order to increase the \mathe-
matical tness" (Warke, 2000b) of the theory and to remove any psychological content which
would not belong to the domain of economics proper (Bruni and Sugden, 2007).
This paper discussed the problems that a multidimensional utility measure imposes for a
theory of determinate choice and for the assessment of welfare. In order to decide not on ad
hoc methodological grounds whether the utility notion should be one- or multidimensional,
I have assessed the evidence from psychology and neurosciences on how to best conceive of
utility. It turned out that empirical evidence does not favor a view of multidimensional utility.
While this does not eliminate the possibility to make a normative argument supporting a
multidimensional notion of utility, I have highlighted some problems that such an argument
would face. Implementing the results from other behavioral sciences (the naturalistic method)
thus yields fruitful impetus for economic research, and in a case such as this one, it can even
conrm conventional economic wisdom: Utility can best remain onedimensional. Economists
rejoice!
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